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THE PROSECUTOR'S CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO
REVEAL EVIDENCE TO THE DEFENDANT
PRESSURE for reform in the area of criminal discovery has led to an in-
creasing literature on the subject. However, commentators have made only
passing reference to a series of fourteenth amendment cases involving the
suppression of evidence by the prosecutor and his duty to reveal that evi-
dence to the defense.1 While none of the suppression cases talks about dig-
covery explicitly the constitutional basis for these decisions might illuminate
the constitutional status of discovery claims.
The most recent suppression cases 2 seem willing to impose an extremely
strict duty of disclosure on the prosecutor. To understand the modern cases
it is important to know how the duty developed. The evolution began with
Mooney v. Holohan.3 On July 22, 1916, a bomb exploded in the midst of a
crowd which had gathered to watch the San Francisco Preparedness Day
Parade. Tom Mooney, labor radical, agitator, and accused anarchist, was
convicted of the crime and sentenced to death. Mooney claimed that the
prosecutor fabricated the entire case. Subsequent investigation showed that
every one of the state's witnesses had lied, with the encouragement of the
district attorney and his assistants.4 The state's chief witness was probably
at least ninety miles away at the time of the explosion.5 The district attorney
intentionally suppressed evidence concerning the credibility of every witness.0
And he suppressed a photograph showing Mooney and his friends on top of
a distant *building two minutes before the explosion.
7
1. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 228,
242-43 (1964); Garber, The Growth of Criminal Discovery, I CRau. L.Q. 3, 11-12
(1962); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advance in Crininal Proce.
dure, 69 YALE LJ. 1149, 1182 n.108 (1960). No mention of the cases is made in Brennan,
The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest For Truth, 1963 WAsH. U.L.Q.
279; in Datz, Discovery in Criminal Procedure, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 163 (1963) ; or iI
Note, 50 VA. L. REv. 535, 552-55 (1964), which argues for discovery as a constitutional
right. Similarly, articles on these prosecutor's duty cases have made only casual sugges-
tions regarding their implications for discovery. Note, 77 HARv. L. Rnv. 1528, 1530
(1964); Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 565, 570-71 (1964). See also Note, 60 COLUM. L. Rtv.
858 (1960).
2. United States ex rel. Butler v. Maroney, 319 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1963) ; Ashley v.
Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963).
3. 294 U.S. 103 (1935). The best account of the Mooney case is contained in a report
prepared by Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Walter H. Pollak, Carl S. Stern, and Thomas A.
Halleran for the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (The Wick-
ersham Commission). CHAFEE, Er AL., THE MOONr'-BILINGS Iroar (1931).
4. Id. at 185-86.
5. Id. at 133.
6. Id. at 189-93.
7. Id. at 187-89. The details of the "frame-up" are too complex to repeat. However,
THE MOONEY-BILLINGs REPORT concluded, inter alia:
(5) Witnesses were produced at the trials with information in the hands of the
prosecution that seriously challenged the credibility of the witnesses, but this
information was deliberately concealed.
PROSECUTOR'S EVIDENCE
The Supreme Court had little difficulty finding that Mooney's claim had
constitutional dimensions. In a per curiam opinion the Court said that due
process
is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice
and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense
of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant
of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the pre-
sentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a
State to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is in-
consistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining
of a like result by intimidation.8
In its opinion the Court emphasized the knowing use of perjured evidence
because it was considered the most serious of the claims. No significance
should be placed on its failure to mention the suppression of evidence favor-
able to the defendant. The suppression was as much a part of the "deliberate
deception" as the use of perjured evidence. P3'lc v. Kansas 9 cleared away
any doubt that existed.
Petitioner's papers . . . set forth allegations that his imprisonment re-
sulted from perjured testimony knowingly used by the State authorities
to obtain his conviction and from the deliberate suppression by those
same authorities of evidence favorable to him. These allegations suffi-
ciently charge a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Federal Con-
stitution. . . Jo
Although the line of cases generated by Mooney involved both kinds of mis-
conduct by the prosecutor the perjury issue is considered first because it
provides a convenient background against which the recent development in
the suppression doctrine can be viewed.
The earlier cases concerned with the knowing use of perjured evidence
merely affirmed the Mooney principle.1 Recent cases show that neither the
effect of the perjury on the jury nor the extent of the prosecutor's instigation
(6) Witnesses were permitted to testify at the trials, despite such knowledge in the
possession of the prosecution of prior contradictory stories told by these wit-
nesses, as to make their mere production a vouching for perjured testimony.
(7) Witnesses were coached in their testimony to a degree that approximated sub-
ornation of perjury. There is a strong inference that some of this coaching was
done by prosecuting officials, and other evidence points to knowledge by the
prosecuting officials that such coaching was being practiced by other witnesses.
(9) After the trials, the disclosures casting doubt on the justice of the convictions
were minimized, and every attempt made to defeat the liberation of the defend-
ants, by a campaign of misrepresentation and propaganda carried on by the
officials who had prosecuted them.
Id. at 242-43.
8. 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935). The writ did not issue, though, because Mooney had
not exhausted his state remedies. Id. at 113-15.
9. 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
10. 'Id. at 215-16 (emphasis added).
11. See Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); and White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760
(1945).
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need go as far as in Mooney. In Alcorta v. Texas 12 the Court found a denial
of due process even though the prosecutor did not instigate the perjury and
even though the perjury was relevant only to Alcorta's sentence, not to his
guilt. In Napue v. Illinois 18 the Court held that a lie which did not concern
any of the facts of the case, but involved the credibility of the witness, tainted
the conviction and necessitated a new trial.
Alcorta and Napue extended the prosecutor's duty regarding perjured
evidence, but not radically. Fundamentally that duty is not to suborn per-
jury,14 not to use evidence known to be false, 1' and to correct state witnesses
who lie.16 Each of these duties provides protection for the individual defen-
dant. While that protection may provide the due process basis for the perjury
cases there is another constitutional consideration.
Perjury or the possibility of perjury strikes at the heart of the judicial
system in its role as finder of truth. When the prosecutor involves himself
in perjury he lends official sanction to the fraud. Necessarily the court, also
a representative of the state, becomes linked with the prosecutor. The court
must combat this threat to its own dignity and to the dignity of the criminal
system or risk the possibility that the community will lose faith in the entire
criminal process. Thus these cases provide protection for the court and the
legal system as well as for the defendant.
Because the prosecutor's misconduct threatens an interest in addition to
that of the individual defendant the perjury cases sometimes look more to the
prosecutor's actions than to the defendant's harm. This is true even though
the courts usually talk in terms of constitutional principles based on prejudice
to the defendant. For example, in Napue v. Illinois 17 the Supreme Court
said that because the witness' lie bore on his credibility the petitioner was
prejudiced. In that case the witness testified that nobody had promised him
consideration for his testimony when in fact the assistant district attorney
had. However, subsequent testimony apprised the jury of his lie. On cross
examination the witness admitted that some unidentified lawyer had promised
him consideration.' 8 The Court stressed that the jury never knew the prose-
cutor did the promising. But the jury did know the witness lied, which was
the only relevant fact in determining the witness' credibility. In short, the
Court did not explain how this particular lie prejudiced the defendant. None-
theless it held that there had been a denial of due process. The only expla-
nation is that the Court concerned itself with the prosecutor's conduct more
than with the defendant's harm, with a protection of the criminal process
12. 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
13. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
14. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
15. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
16. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
17. Ibid.
18. Id. at 268.
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rather than with the possibility that the lie influenced the defendant's con-
viction.:19
In the early years the suppression doctrine relied on the same rationale
as the perjury doctrine. A fraud by the prosecutor threatens the integrity
of the criminal system. For example, in United States c.x rel. Montgomery
v. Ragen 2 0 petitioner was convicted of rape. Before the trial the prosecutor
received a hospital report which indicated that no rape had been committed
on the alleged victim. The e.xamining doctor told the prosecutor he found
no evidence of rape. The prosecutor suppressed both the oral and written
reports. As in the Mooney case the court was faced with a "frame-up."
The suppressed evidence would have exonerated petitioner completely. "There
19. A similar case, upon which the Supreme Court relied in Napue, articulated the
concern more clearly.
The administration of justice must not only be above reproach, it must also be be-
yond the suspicion of reproach .... It is of no consequence that the falsehood
bore upon the witness' credibility rather than directly upon defendant's guilt. A lie
is a lie, no matter what its subject, and, if it is in any way relevant to the case,
the district attorney has the responsibility and duty to correct what he knows to be
false and elicit the truth. Nor does it avail [the State] ... to contend that defend-
ant's guilt was clearly established or that disclosure would not have changed the
verdict.... We may not close our eyes to what occurred; regardless of the quan-
tum of guilt or the asserted persuasiveness of the evidence, the episode may not be
overlooked.
People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y2d 554, 556-57, 136 N.E.2d 853, 854, 154 N.Y.S2d 885, 887
(1956). See also Judge Magruder concurring in Coggins v. O'Brien, 188 F2d 130, 139
(1st Cir. 1951).
The cases denying relief to defendants convicted by a lie not known to the prosecutor
provide another indication that the perjury cases protect more than only the interests of
the defendant. If only the defendant's interests were at stake the fact that the prosecutor
acted innocently would have no importance since the defendant is harmed as much in
these cases as in the knowing use cases. See United States ex rel. Wilson v. Pate, 332
F2d 886 (7th Cir. 1964) ; Green v. United States, 313 F2d 6 (1st Cir. 1963) ; Harrison
v. Boles, 307 F2d 928 (4th Cir. 1962) ; United States v. Jakalski, 237 F 2d 503 (7th Cir.
1956); Wild v. Oklahoma, 187 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1951); Hinley v. Burford, 183 F.2d
581 (10th Cir. 1950); Rollins v. Boles, 228 F. Supp. 6 (N.D. NV. Va. 1964).
For the minority view, see Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 193) ; United
States ax rel. Miller v. Pate, 226 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ill. 1963) ; Durley v. Mayo, 351
U.S. 277, 290-91 (1956) (Douglas, J. dissenting, joined by Warren, Black, and Clark,
It is well settled that to obtain a conviction by the use of testimony known by the
prosecution to be perjured offends due process. [Citations omitted] While the peti-
tioner did not allege that the prosecution knew that petitioner's codefendants were
lying when they implicated petitioner, the State now knows that the testimony of
the only witnesses against petitioner was false. No competent evidence remains to
support the conviction. Deprivation of a hearing under these circumstances amounts
in my opinion to a denial of due process of law.
Ibid. See generally Calm, Law in the Consumer Perspective, 112 U. PA. L. REy. 1, 7-12
(1963).
20. 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1949).
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was no trial here, but a sham, one of false pretenses and fraud." 21 The Supreme
Court concluded that
The methods employed by the prosecution . .. represents as shocking a
situation as ever before presented before this Court. A society cannot
suppress lawlessness by an accused through the means of lawlessness of
the prosecution. A society cannot inspire respect for the law by with-
holding its protection from those accused of crimes.22
The theory of the suppression cases did not remain static. In United
States ex rel. Alneidac v. Baldi 23 petitioner was convicted of first degree
murder for killing a police officer during the course of a robbery, lie was
sentenced to death. The state did not reveal the existence of a bullet which
indicated that the defendant was not the actual killer. Because the state
prosecuted on a felony-murder theory the bullet had no relevance to the guilt
or innocence of the accused. The prosecutor did not manufacture the case.
Yet proof that the petitioner dild not actually fire the shot that killed the police-
man might have mitigated the sentence. The Third Circuit held that the sup-
pression denied petitioner due process. Although the statement of the court
was unclear the decision indicated that it was not necessary to prove the kind
of fraud found in Mooney or Montgomery.
United States ex reL. Thompson v. Dye 24 extended Alneida significantly.
Thompson was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. His
defense was that he was too drunk at the time of the crime to formulate the
necessary intent for first degree murder, or alternatively that his drunken
21. Id. at 387.
22. Ibid. In White Thunder v. Hunter, 149 F.2d 578 (10th Cir. 1945), the Tenth Cir-
cuit did not find the requisite fraud and did not issue the writ, even though the suppressed
evidence would have helped the defendant. Before his trial White Thunder could not
remember where he was on the night of the alleged rape. His mother remembered that
he was at home because that was the night his sister, Charlotte Thin Elk, came home from
the hospital. But his wife claimed that he was in Nebraska visiting her family. In order to
resolve his doubts petitioner requested that the district attorney subpoena two moro wit-
nesses, his sister and one Elmer Jones, a mechanic in White Thunder's garage. The dis-
trict attorney never issued the subpoena. When the witnesses did not appear, White
Thunder accepted his mother's version of the story. After she testified at the trial the
district attorney impeached her testimony by producing hospital records showing that
Charlotte Thin Elk was not released until the night after the crime.
At the subsequent habeas corpus hearing White Thunder's mother-in-law testified that
he had been at her home in Nebraska on the night of the crime, and that Elmer Jones,
one of the missing witnesses, would have verified the story. Therefore it is impossible to
agree with the court that the suppressed evidence would have been "unavailing." Certainly
if Jones had testified that White Thunder was in Nebraska at the time of the crime the
state could not have destroyed this alibi by producing the hospital records. The only way
to understand the denial of habeas corpus is by assuming that while there was a suppres-
sion of evidence which would have been favorable to the defense, the court would allow the
claim only if a fraud or "frame-up" could be proven.
See also Woollomes v. Heinze, 198 F2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1952).
23. 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952).
24. 221 F2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955).
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state should mitigate the sentence. He presented his own testimony and the
testimony of another to prove he was drunk, but the jury did not believe
them. One of the arresting officers would have supported the story by testi-
fying that at the arrest, four hours after the murder, Thompson appeared
drunk. The prosecutor suppressed this evidence. Nothing in the opinion indi-
cates that the prosecutor intended to "frame" the defendant. It is perfectly
conceivable that the District Attorney believed the arresting officer wrong.
Other equally believable witnesses testified that the defendant was "perfectly
alright."25 Yet the Third Circuit held the failure to reveal the arresting officer's
testimony a denial of due process.
Thompson gave a new direction to the suppression cases. For the first time
the prosecutor's motive might have been completely innocent. Because the
prosecutor might not have committed a fraud the rationale based on the
protection of the criminal system disappears. The primary interest at stake
is the defendant's. Although unstated this change was suggested by the em-
phasis the Third Circuit placed on exactly how the suppressed evidence might
have helped the defendant. After Thompson the suppressed evidence cases
could be based, in some as yet undefined way, solely on the disadvantage to
the defendant.
Two Second Circuit cases made explicit what Thompson suggested, that
courts need not concern themselves primarily with the prosecutor's motives
and instead can concentrate on the defendant's harm. In United States v.
Consolidated Laundries Corp.2 6 a negligent suppression of evidence by the
prosecutor necessitated a new trial. As in Thompson a major emphasis was
placed on how the evidence might have helped defendants. Again in Kyle
v. United States27 the Second Circuit held that even a negligent suppression
of evidence could require a new trial depending on how much the suppression
harmed the defendant.2
25. Id. at 765.
26. 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961).
27. 297 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1961).
28. In his opinion Judge Friendly attempted to formulate a relationship between the
degree of misconduct and the degree of harm necessary for a new trial:
[T]he standard of how serious the probable effect of an act or omission at a criminal
trial must be in order to obtain the reversal or, where other requirements are met,
the vacating of a sentence, is in some degree a function of the gravity of the act or
omission; the strictness of the application of the harmless error standard seems some-
what to vary, and its reciprocal, the required showing of prejudice, to vary in-
versely, with the degree to which the conduct of the trial has violated basic concepts
of fair play. At one end of the range is the case where the defendant has simply,
although excusably, not had the benefit of evidence that has later become available
to him; there the Berry test [Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511 (1851)1, requires a showing
that the new evidence "would probably produce a different verdict." At the other end
of the range is the case of a defendant being obliged to plead to a capital charge
without benefit of counsel; there the court "does not stop to inquire whether preju-
dice resulted." Hamilton v. State of Alabama, 82 S. Ct. 157, 159 (1961).
297 F.2d at 514. See also Note, 60 CoLuir. L. REv. 858, 864-65 (1960).
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Because Kyle and Consolidated Laundries involved Federal prosecutions
neither opinion depended on the fourteenth amendment. However, both greatly
affected later fourteenth amendment cases. In 1962 two cases involving state
prosecutions explicitly adopted the Kyle theory that the prosecutor's motive
does not determine the case. In Smallwood v. Warden 29 the state's attorney
withheld evidence concerning both the physical condition and the reputation
of an alleged rape victim. The court accepted the prosecutor's testimony that
he acted in good faith but said that "his motive is immaterial if the evidence
was vital, i.e. was likely to have affected the result of the trial," citing Kyle
and Thompson. 0 In Application of Kapatos 81 the prosecutor failed to reveal
that an eyewitness to the murder in question would have refused to identify
the defendant. Judge Palmieri granted the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
explicitly adopting the Kyle reasoning.
S2
Finally, in 1963 the Supreme Court approved these developments. In Brady
v. Maryland 33 petitioner was convicted of first degree murder on a felony-
murder theory. He admitted his guilt but asked for leniency. His lawyer asked
the state's attorney for a companion's confession to prove that the companion
rather than the appellant did the actual killing. The state turned over all
the companion's statements except the one in which he admitted the actual
homicide. The Maryland Court of Appeals granted a new trial on the issue
of sentencing only. On appeal the Supreme Court went out of its way to
affirm the principle of the Maryland decision.
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favor-
able to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence
is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution."
According to Brady courts need no longer focus upon the conduct of the
prosecutor. When courts do not concern themselves with the prosecutor's
misconduct the constitutional rationale based on fraud has no application.
Instead Brady focuses upon prejudice to the defendant. But prejudice alone
cannot transform an objection into a constitutional claim. Some factor must
differentiate this prejudice from the many constitutionally accepted ways
defendants can be harmed. For example, an erroneous admission of evidence
by a state trial court or a bad interpretation of a state law, without more,
would not raise a constitutional issue, although both errors might harm the
defendant.
The factor which differentiates the suppression cases and gives them con-
stitutional dimension is that they grow out of a situation which makes a fair
trial for many defendants nearly impossible. Suppressed evidence would not
29. 205 F. Supp. 325 (D. Md. 1962).
30. Id. at 329.
31. 208 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
32. Id. at 888.
33. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
34. Id. at 87.
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be a major problem if the defendant had facilities adequate to gather his oum
evidence before the trial. But the defendant's facilities are usually meager
especially when compared to those of the state.35 It seems self-evident that
if a defendant cannot obtain enough evidence to defend himself he cannot
have a fair trial."6 When the prosecutor aggravates defendant's lack of ability
to obtain evidence by not revealing to him material evidence the Constitution
has been violated.3 7 Thus Brady embraces a concept of fairness with which
35. In most criminal cases, the prosecutor has tremendous advantages. In considering
the economic and social facts of life, one cannot possibly compare the total discovery
potential of the prosecution and the defense in any terms of equality.
Garber, stpra note 1, at 5.
Fairly clearly, pretrial discovery by the prosecution is far reaching. And it cannot in
any sense be said to be matched by what is available to the defendant or by what
he can keep from the prosecutor - even when his immunity from self-incrimination
is thrown into the scales. While the possibility that a hitherto undisclosed witness or
theory of defense is always present, an opportunity for surprise is rendered practical-
ly illusory by the government's broad investigatory powers and by the requirement
in many states that the defenses of alibi and insanity must be specifically pleaded.
The sum of the matter is that the defendant is not an effective participant in the pre-
trial criminal process. It is to the trial alone that he must look for justice. Yet the
imbalance of the pretrial period may prevent him from making the utmost of the
critical trial date.
Goldstein, supra note 1, at 1192; Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Crininal Cases, 12
STx. L. REV. 293, 305-06 (1960). See also JoiNT Commirrr ox Co-rL,;m M LEGAL
EDUCATION OF THE AvymrcAx LAW INSTrrUTE AND THE AMPc=ir BAR ASsocATioN;,
PROBLEmS iN CRIMaNAL LAW AND ITs ADmNiSTRATION, THE PROBLEm OF A CRnmAL
DEFENSE 3-6 (1961); REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERT AN
THE ADmISTRATiON OF FEDERAL CRImNAL JUSTICE 26-29 (1963).
36. See Traynor, sitpra note 1, at 242.
37. In claiming for the suppression cases the constitutional principle that a defendant
who can not obtain enough evidence to defend himself has not had a fair trial primary
emphasis has been placed on an analysis of what the courts did in each case. However the
language of the cases lends additional support to this theory.
The purpose of a trial is as much the acquittal of an innocent person as the con-
viction of a guilty one. The average accused usually does not have the manpower
or resources available to the state in its investigation of the crime. Nor does he have
access to all the evidence, much of which has usually been removed or obliterated by
the time he learns that he is to be tried for the crime. In view of this disparity be-
tween the investigating powers of the state and the defendant, I do not tfink it
imposes too onerous a burden on the state to require it to disclose the existence of
a witness of the significance of Danise in the instant case.
Application of Kapatos, 208 F. Supp. 883, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See also United States
ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1964).
The principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a
prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Society wins not only
when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the
administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly... A prose-
cution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available,
would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial which bears
heavily on the defendant
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963).
[Wie state that the trial of a capital case, or indeed of any other trial, no longer
can be considered properly a game of wits and skill. It is clear that men on trial for
1964]
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most courts 3 and commentators 9 agree.40 The importance of Brady
and the other suppression cases is not in any new principle they express but
their lives are entitled to all pertinent facts relating to their defense. .. . [Clounsel
for defendants were entitled to the facts and to make such use of the facts as they
saw fit.
Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.2d 707, 711 (3d Cir. 1958).
38. Many courts have either affirmed or assumed the principle that if a defendant does
not have enough evidence to defend himself he cannot have a fair trial.
In Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), the Supreme Court reversed a con-
viction because the trial court denied defendant's motion for an order requiring the prose-
cution to produce previously reported statements of one of the witnesses. The Court held
that the defendant need not show conflict between the previous reports and the testimony.
Requiring the accused first to show conflict between the reports and the testimony
is actually to deny the accused evidence relevant and material to his defense .... A
requirement of a showing of conflict would be clearly incompatible with our stand-
ards for the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts and must there-
fore be rejected ...
[T]he petitioner is entitled to inspect the reports to decide whether to use them
in his defense. Because only the defense is adequately equipped to determine the
effective use for purpose of discrediting the Government's witness and thereby fur-
thering the accused's defense, the defense must initially be entitled to see them to
determine what use may be made of them. Justice requires no less.
Id. at 667-69.
In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), the Supreme Court said:
A further limitation on the applicability of the [informer's] privilege [which would
act to deny defendant information] arises from the fundamental requirements of
fairness. Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his
communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential
to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.
Id. at 60-61.
See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 362-63 (1959); People v. Johnson, 356
Mich. 619, 626-28, 97 N.W.2d 739, 742-43 (1959) ; State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 137, 145
A2d 313, 316 (1958) ; Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 705, 312 P.2d 698, 699-
700 (1956) ; People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 586, 305 P.2d 1, 13 (1956) ; State ex rel,
Mahoney v. Superior Court, 78 Ariz. 74, 79, 275 P.2d 887, 890 (1954) ; Commonwealth v.
Stepper, 54 Lack. Jur. 205, 212 (Pa. C.P. 1952).
39. Do not these less privileged of our society present the particular problem that
without resources to prepare a defense, they often don't have an adequate defense?
Can we boast a decent administration of the criminal law if we don't provide thent
with some redress against hard reality?
Brennan, suipra note 1, at 286. See Garber, s pra note 1, at 12; Traynor, snpra note 1, at
242; Goldstein, supra note 1, at 1192, quoted in note 35 supra. See also Fletcher, snpra
note 35, at 305-08; and Krantz, Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases: A Necessity For
Fair and Impartial Justice, 42 NEB. L. Rv. 127, 130-33 (1962).
40. Those who claim that trials are fair enough without giving the defendant any evi-
dence argue that the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination and other protections
adequately redress the imbalance caused by the state's overwhelming investigatory facilities,
See, e.g., State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 211-12, 98 A.2d 881, 884-85 (1953) ; State v. Rhoads,
81 Ohio St. 397, 425, 91 N.E. 186, 192 (1910); Flannery, The Prosecutor's Case Against
Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 74 (1963). But these arguments ignore the defendant's real
position. See Goldstein, supra note 1. See also note 35 snpra; Louisell, Criminal Discovery:
Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 56, 86-90, 97 (1961).
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in their indication that the principle has constitutional dimensions and must
be enforced in state proceedings.
Having recognized the prosecutor's constitutional duty to reveal evidence
to the defendant the courts must now formulate standards to determine what
kinds of evidence must be revealed. Some courts have attempted to do so.
For example, in Kyle v. United States41 Judge Friendly measured the de-
fendant's prejudice by how much the suppressed evidence affected the jury's
verdict. Absent misbehavior by the prosecutor Friendly would require a show-
ing that the suppressed evidence "would probably produce a different verdict." 42
But this formulation loses sight of what causes the defendant's prejudice.
It is the imbalance of investigatory facilities which harms the defendant. The
imbalance leads to an uninformed and poorly prepared defense, and conse-
quently to an unfair trial.43 The real harm is done before the trial and it is
to that period rather than to the trial and the highly speculative impact on
the jury, that courts should look. If the question asked by the court is to
correspond to the real needs of the defendant out of which these cases grew,
and to the factor which gives these cases constitutional dimensions, it must
be, what effect did the suppression have on defendant's preparation for trial?
Two recent cases illustrate that courts have begun to recognize this question
as germane to the determination of whether the suppression of evidence denies
defendants due process. In United States ex rel. Butler v. Maroney44 the
petitioner had been convicted of murder in the first degree. Butler claimed
that he was denied due process because the trial judge refused to allow his
lawyer to examine a statement given to the police by an eye witness. The state-
ment showed that the victim and petitioner had struggled before the shooting.
Judge Ganey cited Brady and ordered the writ to be issued.
It seems clear that evidence contained in the statement would not have
affected the jury's verdict. Since the jury already had adequate evidence be-
fore it concerning the struggle 45 the suppressed evidence -as cumulative only.
The Butler case cannot be understood in terms of the prejudicial effect of
the suppression in the eyes of the jury. As in the other cases the real injury
was done to the defendant before the trial, when counsel was preparing his
case. At the trial counsel based his entire defense on defendant's temporary
insanity at the time of the shooting. Although facts indicating an accidental
shooting came out at the trial counsel did not emphasize them. Had he seen
the statement earlier he might have claimed an additional defense, and his
41. 297 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1961).
42. Id. at 514. See also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); United States
ex reL Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763, 769 (3d Cir. 1955) (Hastie, J, concurring);
Application of Kapatos, 208 F. Supp. 883, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Smallwood v. Warden,
205 F. Supp. 325, 329 (D. Aid. 1962); Application of Landeros, 154 F. Supp. 183, 186-88
(D.N.J. 1957).
43. See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
44. 319 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1963).
45. See id. at 629-31 (Kalodner, 3., dissenting).
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case might have been reorganized to emphasize the struggle. The defendant
was injured because his counsel did not see the statement and therefore did
not include a possible defense.46
A recent Fifth Circuit case contains a more explicit recognition of the
question. In Ashley v. Texas 47 the appellant was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death. He claimed that he was denied due process by the sup-
pression of a report given to the prosecutor by two psychiatrists indicating
that Ashley was insane. Instead the defense counsel was informed that another
psychiatrist, Dr. Sher, found Ashley sane. In this case the suppressed infor-
mation did not even relate to the only defense raised at trial - self defense.
But it adversely affected the preparation for trial. Ashley's lawyer testified
that Dr. Sher's report
led me to the conclusion that no other psychiatrist of any kind had ex-
amined the defendants or either of them, at the request of the District
Attorney's office, and bad I been informed of Dr. Crowe and Dr. Tracktir
had made a finding that Leslie Douglas Ashley was of unsound mind and
legally insane, as contemplated by the criminal laws of the State of Texas
then, of course, I would have enlisted further psychiatric assistance in
the case and sought to have the testimony of Dr. Crowe and Dr. Tracktir
adduced before a jury on a defense of insanity as to said Leslie Douglas
Ashley prior to the main trial, or as issues in the main trial, and in either
event would have in all likelihood pleaded insanity as of the time of the
insanity hearing and the main trial, and would not have introduced Leslie
Douglas Ashley as a witness in his own behalf in a joint trial of the
two defendants.48
Admirably, Judge Tuttle focused on defendant's pre-trial preparation and not
on any supposed effect on the jury.
We conclude that without any such expression from the trial counsel
that the fact of the opinions of Drs. Crowe and Tracktir favorable to the
defendants, is of such vital significance to the accused persons in planning
and conducting their defense, the failure of the District Attorney to
inform their counsel of this fact amounts to such fundamental unfairness
in the trial of a criminal case as to amount to a denial of due process.40
If the courts accept the effect of the undisclosed evidence on defendant's
preparation for trial as determining whether due process has been denied,
and they cannot reject this standard without also rejecting the constitutional
basis for the suppression cases, then the complete suppression of evidenze
can no longer be the court's only concern. Any failure to reveal evidence
before the trial may affect preparation adversely, even if the evidence is pre-
46. "This withholding by the Commonwealth of information impinging on a vital area
in appellant's defense is a denial of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment."
Id. at 627.
47. 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963). See Note, 77 HARv. L. R -v. 1528 (1964).
48. 319 F.2d at 85.
49. Ibid. See also United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964).
"We cannot speculate as to the effect this testimony would have had on the jury if It had
an opportunity to hear it." Id. at 140.
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sented at trial. If the principle of the suppression cases is followed, the prose-
cutor's duty must expand significantly.
Previously that duty seems to have been limited to revealing evidence
tending to prove the defendant innocent.50 But limiting the prosecutor's duty
to exculpatory evidence does not meet the constitutional demands of the sup-
pression cases. Unfavorable evidence may help the defendant prepare his
case. A confession might be extremely damaging. But if the prosecutor does
not reveal it the defendant may be substantially hampered in his preparation
for trial, more seriously hampered, perhaps, than if the prosecutor had failed
to reveal exculpatory evidence.5' Documents, papers and other tangible evi-
dence might tend to prove defendant's guilt, but unless the prosecutor reveals
them the defendant cannot prepare his case properly.52
Another reason exists for not limiting the prosecutor's duty to exculpatory
evidence. In many cases it is impossible to tell in advance of trial what evidence
tends to prove innocence and what does not. Most evidence is inherently neutral.
A used bullet proves no one guilty unless the prosecutor provides the necessary
links between the defendant, the bullet and the victim. Similarly, the bullet
proves no one innocent until the defense lawyer can show that there was
no connection. Unless the bullet is revealed, though, the defendant's lawyer
may never have the chance to show that it is exculpatory.
Neither can the evidence's admissibility circumscribe the duty. Certainly
inadmissible evidence can help the defendant prepare his case as much as
admissible evidence. Also, any judgment concerning admissibility made before
the trial cannot be tested effectively unless the defense lawyer is given the
opportunity to argue the issue. If the prosecutor makes the decision he will
have performed his adversary's job. Griffin v. United States 5 illustrates.
There the prosecutor did not reveal that an open penknife had been found in
the deceased's pocket. Since its existence was unknown to the appellant at
the time of the murder, it would have been an "uncommunicated threat." At
the time of the trial the uncommunicated threat theory of self-defense had
not been accepted in the District of Columbia. The prosecutor thought that
the evidence was not admissible because it was not relevant to any issue in
the case. On appeal the circuit court changed the rule regarding uncommuni-
cated threats and held that the suppression of the knife necessitated a new
50. Some courts talk about the duty in terms of exculpatory evidence. E.g., Pyle v.
Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942). Others talk about "material" evidence. E.g., United
States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763, 765 (3d Cir. 1955). And some courts talk
about both in the same opinion. Compare Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963),
quoted in text accompanying note 34 .supra, with Brady v. Maryland, id. at 88, quoted in
note 37 .supra. Although their language and reasoning may have lacked precision courts
have given relief only when the evidence was exculpatory in some way.
51. See State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958).
52. See State ex rel. Mahoney v. Superior Court, 78 Ariz. 74, 275 P.2d 887 (1954).
53. 183 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1950). See also Pit'mu-, DEATH AND THE SuREZIE
CouRT 107-36 (1961).
19641
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
trial. If the evidence had 'remained suppressed, the prosecutor's judgment
that it was irrelevant could not have been challenged.
[The prosecutor's] opinion that evidence of the concealed knife was in-
admissible was a reasonable opinion, which the District Court sustained
and no court has overruled until today. However, the case emphasizes
the necessity of disclosure by the prosecution of evidence that may rea-
sonably be considered admissible and useful to the defense. When there
is substantial room for doubt, the prosecutor is not to decide for the court
what is admissible or for the defense what is useful5
4
If the rationale of the suppression cases is to be followed the only accept-
able standard is the evidence's usefulness to the defense. This standard re-
quires the prosecutor to reveal all relevant evidence " since the usefulness
of any particular piece of evidence can be tested effectively only by revealing
it to the defense. Allowing the prosecutor to judge whether or not evidence
is helpful without giving it to the defense counsel would be tampering with
the adversary process dramatically. The prosecutor's job is to present the
state's case, not to determine what theories his opponent can use. The Griffin
court recognized that "the prosecutor is not to decide .. .for the defense
what is useful."' 6
Perhaps it would be possible to allow the judge to decide the usefulness
of the evidence without first revealing it to the defenseY7 In civil suits courts
are forced sometimes to do just thatY8 However, those cases are exceptional
ones, usually involving claims of privilege by the party opposing disclosure.
The major effort has been to minimize judicial intervention.59 The same reasons
for not involving the courts in civil cases apply in criminal ones. The adminis-
trative burden of deciding usefulness in every case would overbear the courts.
Usually the judge does not know enough about the case at the time he must
decide usefulness for that decision to be an informed one. In order to inform
himself adequately he must try the entire case every time a question arises.
54. 183 F2d at 992-93. In California a defendant need not show that evidence is ad-
missible in order for it to be discoverable. People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 2d 755, 770, 349 P.2d
964, 973 (1960) ; Traynor, supra note 1, at 244 n.93.
55. The concept of revelance should be construed broadly, as in civil cases. See 4
MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1174-85 (1963); Griffin v. United States, 183 F.2d 990, 993
(D.C. Cir. 1950).
56. 183 F.2d at 993. See also Traynor, supra note 1, at 228:
The plea for the adversary system is that it elicits a reasonable approximation of
the truth. The reasoning is that with each side on its mettle to present its own case
and to challenge its opponent's, the relevant unprivileged evidence in the main
emerges in the ensuing clash. Such reasoning is hardly realistic unless the evidence
is accessible in advance to the adversaries so that each can prepare accordingly in the
light of such evidence.
57. See Application of Kapatos, supra note 31, at 888.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953), where the Court
decided that the evidence involved was not very necessary since an alternative source of
evidence existed.
59. 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1040-42 (1963).
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Even absent administrative considerations there is no assurance that courts
could make this determination successfully. The judge's decision will be no
more than a guess. What weight will he give to the ingenuity of the defense
counsel? In short, judges are unsuited to answer particular questions of
usefulness. These questions should be for the accused's lawyerS° The judge's
job is as a neutral arbiter, not as a defense strategist.61
Unless the courts repudiate the constitutional basis of the suppression cases,
and thereby reject the thirty-year development of a principle now widely
accepted,6 2 the prosecutor should be required to reveal all relevant evidence
to the defendant. Many serious questions concerning how the duty will be
enforced remain for the courts to answer. For example, it seems inconceivable
that the courts will continue to wait for an appeal or a habeas corpus hearing
to impose the duty. Since all the evidence will be revealed eventually 3 and
a new trial granted, it seems irrational to wait so long before requiring the
disclosure. Similarly to impose the duty during the trial would require con-
stant continuances 64 and therefore would not be administratively feasible. The
only reasonable time for the prosecutor to reveal his evidence is during the
pretrial period."- Questions concerning whether or not defense counsel must
request the evidence also remain to be answered."6 Ways of protecting the
legitimate interests of the prosecutor - informer's privilege, work-product
protection, protecting witnesses from possible intimidation by the defendant
- and the interests of the society - state secrets and executive privilege -
have not been defined. Neither have the courts considered how to prevent
defense lawyers from abusing the benefits they acquire from the prosecutor's
60. See United States v. Jencks, 353 U.S. 657, 669 (1957). "The practice of producing
government documents to the trial judge for his determination of relevancy and materiality.
without hearing the accused, is disapproved." Ibid. But see the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C § 3500
(1958).
61. Of course we do not mean to suggest that the courts should not be involved when
a dispute arises between the prosecutor and the defense counsel. Once the courts set guide-
lines, however, these cases should be rare.
62. See text accompanying notes 38 & 39 supra. Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 510-11
(1958), and Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 801-02 (1952), have never been considered
limitations on the suppression cases. In any event; both were decided before Brady v.
Maryland, and lack strong precedential value.
63. The Note here assumes an honest prosecutor. Any mechanism for disclosure would
be ineffective if the prosecutor were dishonest. Problems of policing the prosecutor may
arise, but they are beyond the scope of this Note.
64. See Traynor, supra note 1, at 242 n.77.
65. See Commonwealth v. Stepper, 54 Lack, fur. 205 (Pa. C.P. 1952). "We vould
rather remove any obstacle to a fair trial, before the trial, rather than have it removed
later and double the expense of difficult proceedings to the commonwealth." Id. at 212-13.
66. Since these suppression cases are based on the defendant's lack of lmowledge about
relevant evidence rights and duties arising out of them should not be made to depend too
heavily on his making a request for information. See Barbee v. Warden, 331 F2d 842, 845
(4th Cir. 1964); and United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir.
1964).
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duty. Nor has the claim that the defense should be required to reveal its evi-
dence been discussed adequately. 7 All of these are hard questions, but their
difficulty does not excuse the courts or the legislatures from finding the
answers. °s The suppression cases articulate a constitutional principle which
must now be effectuated.
67. But see Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919 (1962).
68. Guidance may be found in a close study of civil and criminal discovery mechanisms
in federal and state jurisdictions. The experience in California might be particularly help.
ful. See Traynor, supra note 1, at 243-50. See also Louisell, supra note 40; and Note, 60
YALE L.J. 626 (1951).
